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NATURE OF THE CASE 
Valad Electric Heating Corp. is a New York cor-
poration with headquarters in Terrytown, New York. It 
contracted to supply electrical heaters to be utilized by a 
Utah corporation, Mallory, in a project Mallory was 
constructing in the State of Utah for the United States 
Government. Valad's heaters proved to be defective and this 
case arose out of that failure to perform. 
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE ON APPEAL 
The lower Court, after trial, awarded judgment to 
Mallory against Valad and Ted R. Brown & Associates, and to 
Ted R. Brown & Associates, Inc. against Valad. Valad having 
raised the issue of jurisdiction based upon the Long Arm 
Statute, the Supreme Court found that jurisdiction existed. 
By Petition for Rehearing, Valad seeks to challenge that 
portion of the decision. The District Court made a liberal 
allowance of consequential and unrelated damage. This 
action of the District Court was protested on the main 
appeal by both Valad and Brown. The Supreme Court decision 
does not deal with the problem raised on damages and merely 
affirms the action of the lower Court. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON THE REHEARING 
Brown seeks to have the Court uphold its decision 
on the issue of jurisdiction over Valad and to reconsider 
and to modify the allowance of damages by eliminating the 
consequential and indirect damages not properly allowable 
under the Commercial Code or established criteria for the 
allowance and establishment of damages in a contract action 
of this nature. 
SUMMARY OF THE FACTS 
Exhaustive and detailed factual statements were 
made in the briefs filed on the main appeal. It is not 
deemed helpful to the Court to reiterate the lengthy state-
ments therein made. In brief, it may be stated that 
Mallory, plaintiff and respondent, is a conpany engaged in 
the manufacture of certain components utilized by the 
government in the nature of a test chamber and that in the 
execution of a contract which it had with the government, it 
required certain types cf electrical heaters that would per-
form in accordance with a fixed criteria. In order to 
obtain these heaters, Mallory consulted with Ted R. Brown & 
-2-
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Associates, a sales engineering firm. Ted R. Brown & 
Associates supplied advertising literature and catalogue 
data relative to the manufacturing potentials of Valad 
Electric Heating Corporation and ultimately received an 
order from Mallory for certain heaters to be incorporated in 
the product Mallory was manufacturing for the United States 
Government. Brown passed this order on to Valad for 
manufacture, delivery, and warranty. Some of the heaters 
manufactured by Valad proved to be defective. The remainder 
were never delivered by Valad. Valad has claimed that it 
did not submit itself to the jurisdiction of the Utah Courts 
by contracting to provide these heaters to Mallory. Brown 
took the position in the original action that Valad did sub-
mit itself to the jurisdiction of the Court under the Long 
Arm Statute of the State of Utah, 78-27-24, UCA 1953, as 
amended. This Court affirmed the action of the District 
Court in finding jurisdiction existed over Valad in the Utah 
Courts. Any additional factual information necessary to the 
consideration of this matter will be set forth in and under 
the argument. 
-3-
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT UNDER DATE OF MARCH 6th, 
1980, ON THE ISSUE OF JURISDICTION OVER VALAD IS CORRECT, 
DOES NOT VIOLATE THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, AND NO 
REHEARING ON THIS ISSUE SHOULD BE GRANTED. 
The petitioner for rehearing, Valad Electric 
Heating Corp., seeks to substantiate an attack upon the 
decision of this Court finding jurisdiction over Valad upon 
a recent case decided by the Supreme Court of the United 
States entitled World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. vs. Woodson. In 
addition, the petitioner for rehearing seeks to indicate 
that by reason of the transaction being "an isolated 
occurrence", in some manner the finding of jurisdiction 
constitutes a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution. Neither position can be 
substantiated. 
Factually, the case of World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. 
vs. Woodson is so totally distinct from the facts involved 
in the instant case before this Court, that no parallel can 
be drawn from that decision. The World-Wide Volkswagen 
case, decided January 21st, 1980, by the Supreme Court of 
-4-
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the United States, opinion No. 78-1078, involved a situation 
in which Harry and Kay Robinson, residents of the State of 
New York, bought an Audi automobile from Seaway Volkswagen, 
Inc., an automobile dealer with headquarters in Messina, New 
York, in the year 1976. The following year the Robinson 
family, residents of the State of New York, left that State 
to establish a new home in the State of Arizona. As they 
passed through the State of Oklahoma in route to Arizona, 
their car was struck in the rear by another car and a fire 
resulted which burned Kay Robinson and two of the children 
rather severely. The Robinsons thereafter brought a pro-
ducts liability case in the District Court for Creek County, 
Oklahoma, claiming that the injuries resulted from defective 
design and placement of the gas tank and fuel system on the 
Audi car. There had been no contact whatever with anyone in 
the State of Oklahoma in regard to this motor vehicle or its 
use in that State, and the sole basis upon which it could be 
contended that the dealer and the manufacturer could be held 
to be subject to the jurisdiction of the Oklahoma Court was 
on the basis that an automobile being transitory by nature, 
might reasonably be anticipated to be used in any State and 
consequently, the Courts of any State might have jurisdic-
-5-
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tion over a manufacturer or dealer. 
The Supreme Court of the United States found speci-
fically that this did not come within the purview of Long 
Arm jurisdiction and that personal jurisdiction could not be 
established over the dealer or the manufacturer under these 
facts. The opinion of the Supreme Court specifically 
recognizes that the limits imposed on State jurisdiction by 
the Due Process Clause of the Constitution has been substan-
tially relaxed over the past years. However, the Supreme 
Court reiterated that: 
"Hence, even while abandoning the 
shibboleth, that 'the authority of every tri-
bunal is necessarily restricted by the terri-
torial limits of the State in which it is 
established' Pennoyer vs. Neff, supra at 720, 
we emphasize that the reasonableness of 
asserting jurisdiction over the defendant must 
be assessed 'in the context of our federal 
system of government International Shoe Co. 
vs. Washington, supra at 317, and stressed 
that the Due Process Clause insures, not only 
fairness, but also the 'orderly administration 
of the laws.' As we noted in Hanson vs. 
Denkla, 357 U.S. 235: 
'As technilogical progress has increased 
the flow of commerce between the States, 
the need for jurisdiction over the nonre-
sidents has undergone a similar increase. 
At the same time, progress in com-
munications and transportation has made 
the defense of a suit in a foreign tribu-
nal less burdensome. In response to 
-6-
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these changes, the requirements for per-
sonal jurisdiction over nonresidents have 
evolved from the rigid rule of Pennoyer 
vs. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, to the flexible 
standard of International Shoe Co. vs. 
Washington, 326 U.S. 310.'" 
The Court, in the remainder of its opinion, points out that 
the minimum contacts referred to in the International Shoe 
Co. case must be found, but that in establishing these 
contacts, it must be fair and equitable and just so to do. 
It points out that foreseeability is a criteria that has 
merit and that in this case, there was no reasonable way to 
foresee that a car sold to a New York resident in the State 
of New York by a New York dealer might subsequently be 
involved in an accident in the State of Oklahoma and that a 
claim against the dealer and the manufacturer would arise 
out of this accident. The Court in applying this standard 
said: 
"But the foreseeability that is critical 
to due process analysis is not the mere like-
lihood that a product will find its way into 
the forum State. Rather, it is that the 
defendants' conduct in connection with the 
forum State are such that he should reasonably 
anticipate being haled into court there. See 
Kulko vs. Superior Court, supra, at 97-98; 
Shaffer vs. Heitner, supra, at 216; and***The 
Due Process Clause, by ensuring the 'orderly 
administration of the laws,' International 
Shoe Co. vs. Washington, gives a degree of 
-7-
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predictability to the legal system that allows 
potential defendants to structure their pri-
mary conduct with some minimum assurance as to 
where that conduct will and will not render 
them liable to suit." 
"When a corporation 'purposefully avails 
itself of the privilege of conducting activi-
ties within the forum State,' Hanson vs. 
Denkla, supra, at 253, it has clear notice 
that it is subject to suit there, and can act 
to alleviate the risk of burdensome litigation 
by procuring insurance, passing the expected 
costs on to customers, or, if the risks are 
too great, severing its connection with the 
State.***" 
Certainly, in this case, Valad had every notice 
that it was engaging in a transaction wherein failure to 
perform satisfactorily might result in its being held to 
account in the Courts of the State of Utah. The initial 
contacts made with Valad were made telephonically from Mr. 
Nyman of Brown, to Mr. Ceccini of Valad. It was clearly 
indicated in these preliminary telephone conversations that 
Valad was being solicited to specially manufacture a product 
for use by a Utah resident in the accomplishment of the pur-
poses of that Utah resident. As the matter progressed and 
there were further telephone conversations and the exchange 
of written criteria and diagrams with which the limits of 
performance were more specifically delineated, it was made 
clear that the product which Valad was to manufacture for 
-8-
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Mallory had to be warranted and guaranteed by Valad to 
Mallory to perform in the context in which it was to be 
placed. All of this clearly put the Valad Electric Heating 
Corp. in the position of knowingly contracting to supply 
services or goods in the State of Utah. In addition, it 
knew that it was issuing a certificate of guarantee or 
warranty to the ultimate user, namely, Mallory, which cor-
poration was incorporating the heater in a product it was in 
turn manufacturing for the United States Government. 
No reasonable interpretation of the acts of the parties 
could have possibly said that Valad could not, under such 
circumstances, contemplate that it might be held accountable 
for any failure on the part of its product by an action in 
the Courts of the State of Utah. We respectfully submit 
that the attempt by Valad to utilize the decision of the 
Supreme Court in the World-Wide Volkswagen case, as a ground 
for contesting the decision of this Court establishing 
jurisdiction over Valad is a misapplication of the 
World-Wide Volkswagen case and its facts. We specifically 
direct to the Court's attention that the isolated occurrence 
criteria which is relied upon by counsel in its petition for 
rehearing has no bearing where there has been a deliberate 
-9-
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and conscious contract made and entered into to supply goods 
or services in the State of Utah by an out of state company. 
We respectfully submit that the decision of the 
Supreme Court sustaining the lower Court in finding that 
jurisdiction over Valad by the Courts of this State did 
exist under the Long Arm Statute is a good and valid deci-
sion and should not be altered. 
POINT II 
THE COURT SHOULD RECONSIDER THE MATTER OF DAMAGES AND ALTER 
THE AWARD BY THE LOWER COURT TO CONFORM TO THE ACCEPTED 
MEASURE OF DAMAGES AND IN RECOGNITION OF THE RELATIVE 
CULPABILITY OF THE PARTIES. 
The defendant, Ted R. Brown & Associates, Inc., 
requests that the Court review the issue of damages. It is 
not deemed necessary that there be a rehearing, but in the 
main opinion the Court did not treat the subject of damages, 
though it was raised and argued in all briefs on the main 
case. 
While the Commercial Code recognizes the right in 
the event of breach for the buyer to recover incidental and 
consequential damages as set forth at 70A-2-715 of the 
-10-
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Uniform Utah Commercial Code, the failure of the Court to 
apply the standards acknowledgedly acceptable in determining 
what constitutes consequential and incidental damage, opens 
the door to abuse in the future. The method utilized by the 
respondent, Mallory, to compute damages, which it refers to 
as "the job completion method", has no relevance to the 
ascertainment of actual damage, including consequential or 
incidental damage which is allowable under either the former 
criteria prior to the adoption of the Commercial Code, or 
under the Commercial Code. Particularly, we point out that 
for the Court not to recognize the distinction between the 
liability of Brown and the liability of Valad results in a 
gross injustice and inequity. All parties to the transac-
tion recognize that Brown was not responsible for the manu-
facture of the ordered heaters. The order was placed with 
Valad by Brown with the full knowledge and consent of the 
ultimate purchaser, Mallory. Mallory requested a direct 
guarantee from the fabricator. All of this has been pre-
viously set forth in the briefs of the parties. The 
District Court drew no distinction between the culpability 
of Brown and the culpability of Valad. Even the citations 
by the respondent, Mallory, in its brief, refer to: 
-11-
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"If the defendant has been responsible 
for the plaintiff's incurring or wasting 
reasonably foreseeable overhead expenses***" 
(Brief of Respondent Mallory, Page 32) 
Brown was in no way responsible for the plaintiff's 
incurring or wasting overhead expense. Brown properly 
placed the order after having conformed with Mallory's 
requests in every particular. No one pointed out any 
substantial differentiation between the order as placed by 
Brown and the order as placed by Mallory with Brown. It was 
transmitted intact, accompanied by a copy of the original 
order from Mallory to Brown, to Valad as the fabricator. 
Valad's failure to fabricate in accordance with the order 
resulted in whatever damage ·occurred. To permit Mallory the 
option of holding Brown responsible, and satisfying itself 
against Brown and compelling Brown to proceed against Valad 
to try and collect the judgment in a foreign State, gives a 
degree of protection to Mallory that it is not entitled to 
under the facts and circumstances of this case. 
We respectfully urge that the Court review again 
the issues presented by the briefs concerning damages and 
adjust the matter of damages in accordance with the substan-
tial equities between the parties. 
-12-
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CONCLUSION 
The requested rehearing on the issue of jurisdic-
tion should be denied. Damages should be reconsidered and 
adjusted in accordance with the law and equity between the 
parties. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ALLEN H. TIBBALS 
Attorney for TED R. BROWN & 
ASSOCIATES I INC. 
400 Chancellor Building 
220 South 200 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-7575 
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